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Abstract. We discuss generalized pobabilistic models for which states
not necessarily obey Kolmogorov’s axioms of probability. We study the
relationship between properties and probabilistic measures in this set-
ting, and explore some possible interpretations of these measures.
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1 Introduction
The debate regarding the interpretation of probability theory remains still open
in the literature [2]. And these interpretational problems become particularly
important when the probabilities arising in quantum phenomena are considered
[36]. The statistical nature of Quantum Theory posed intriguing questions since
its beginnings. This was expressed, for example, by R. P. Feynman[50], who
stressed the radical changes needed in the methods for computing probabilities:
I should say, that in spite of the implication of the title of this talk the
concept of probability is not altered in quantum mechanics. When I say
the probability of a certain outcome of an experiment is p, I mean the
conventional thing, that is, if the experiment is repeated many times one
expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in question is
roughly p. I will not be at all concerned with analyzing or defining this
concept in more detail, for no departure of the concept used in classical
statistics is required. What is changed, and changed radically, is the
method of calculating probabilities.
The sum rule of probability amplitudes giving rise to interference terms was
rapidly recognized as a non-classical feature [4]. Later, it was discovered that this
was strongly related to the nonexistence of joint distributions for noncommuting
observables. These peculiarities and formal aspects of the probabilities involved
in quantum theory have been vastly studied in the literature [5–11].
One of the most important axiomatizations in probability theory is due to Kol-
mogorov [12]. In his approach, probabilities are considered as measures defined
over a Boolean sigma algebra of a sample space, i.e., as positive maps defined on
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certain subsets of a given set. Interestingly enough, states of classical statistical
theories can be described using Kolmogorov’s axioms, because they define mea-
sures over the sigma algebra of measurable subsets of phase space. An interesting
approach to the statistical character of quantum systems consists in consider-
ing quantum states as measures over the non-Boolean structure of projection
operators in a Hilbert space [3, 4, 7]. As is well known, projection operators can
be used to describe elementary experiments (the analogue of this notion in the
classical setting is represented by subsets of phase space). In this way, a com-
parison between quantum states and classical probabilistic states can be traced
in formal and conceptual grounds. The equivalence between this approach and
the usual one, based on the Born’s rule [25], is provided by Gleason’s theorem
[34, 35]. This is the reason why quantum states are termed “non-Boolean or
non-Kolmogorovian” probability measures [7].
It is important to remark that a generalization of Kolmogorov’s axioms can
be given in terms of measures over arbitrary orthomodular lattices (instead of
Boolean algebras) [22, 23, 5]. This approach contains quantum and classical sta-
tistical models as particular instances [4, 7]. Another way to put this in a more
general setting, is to consider a set of states of a particular probabilistic model
as a convex set [4]. While classical systems can be described as simplexes, non-
classical theories can display a more involved geometrical structure. These mod-
els can go far beyond classical and quantum mechanics, and can be used to
described different theories (see for example [27, 28] and references therein). We
will discuss these notions in Section 2 of this work.
The fact that states can be considered as measures over different sets of pos-
sible experimental results, reveals an essential structural feature of a vast family
of physical statistical theories. A statistical model must specify the probabilities
of actualization of all possible measurable quantities of the system involved: this
is a feature which is common to all models, no matter how different they are. In
this paper, we want to study which are the possible ontologies compatible with
the general features arising in generalized probabilistic models. The fact that
generalized models of physical theories can be characterized using very precise
mathematical structures, should allow us to draw conclusions about possible
interpretations. A study of the ontological constrains imposed by this general
structure was not addressed previously in the literature. As we shall see, the alge-
braic and geometric features of the event structures defined by these measurable
properties imposes severe restrictions on the interpretation of the probabilities
defined by generalized states. In Section 3 we will show that a novel approach,
based on putting constrains on degrees of belief functions defined over arbitrary
orthomodular lattices [36, 37], is particularly suitable for an extension of the
Bayesian interpretation to arbitrary contextual probabilistic models. We will
also see that, an ontology based on bundles of actual properties poses serious
difficulties in most models of interest (specially, in all those which are not clas-
sical). An approach based on bundles of possible properties is discussed as an
alternative [51]. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 4.
III
2 Non-Kolmogorovian probabilistic models
Suppose that we have a physical system whose states are given by measures which
yield definite probabilities for the different outcomes of all possible experiments.
From an operational perspective, these probabilities can be understood first in
the sense used by Feynman in the quotation of Section 1. Then, for an experiment
E with discrete outcomes {Ei}i=1,..,n, a state ν gives us a probability p(Ei, ν) :=
ν(Ei) ∈ [0, 1] for each possible value of i. The real numbers p(Ei, ν) must satisfy∑n
i=1 p(Ei, ν) = 1; otherwise, the probabilities would not be normalized. In this
way, each state ν defines a concrete probability for each possible experiment.
A crucial assumption here is that the set of all possible states C is convex:
this assumption allows to form new states by mixing old ones and [33, 28]). In
formulae, if ν1 and ν2 are states in C, then
ν = αν1 + (1− α)ν2 (1)
belongs to C for all α ∈ [0, 1]. We will also assume that it is a compact set. This
mixing property can be extended trivially to finite mixtures with more than two
elements. Notice that each possible outcome Ei of each possible experiment E,
induces a linear functional Ei(...) : C −→ [0, 1], with Ei(ν) := ν(Ei). Functionals
of this form are usually called effects. Thus, an experiment will then be a col-
lection of effects (functionals) satisfying
∑n
i=1Ei(ν) = 1 for all states ν ∈ C. In
other words, the functional
∑n
i=1Ei(...) equals the identity functional 1 (which
satisfies 1(ν) = 1 for all ν ∈ C). Any compact convex set C can be canonically
embedded as a base for the positive cone V+(C) of a regularly ordered linear V (C)
(see [29] and [30] for details). This means that for every element z in V+(C), we
can write z = tν in a unique way, with t ≥ 0 and ν ∈ C.
In this way, any possible experiment that we can perform on the system, is
described as a collection of effects represented mathematically by affine func-
tionals in an affine space V ∗(C). A model represented by a convex set C will
be said to be finite dimensional if and only if V (C) is finite dimensional. As in
the quantum and classical cases, extreme points of the convex set of states will
represent pure states.
It is important to remark the generality of the framework described above:
all possible probabilistic models with finite outcomes can be described in such
a way. Furthermore, if suitable definitions are made, it is possible to include
continuous outcomes in this setting.
A face F of a convex set C is a convex subset of it satisfying that for all µ, if
µ = αµ1+(1−α)µ2 with α ∈ [0, 1], then µ ∈ F if and only if µ1 ∈ F and µ2 ∈ F .
Faces can be interpreted geometrically as subsets that are stable under mixing
and purification. Faces are very important for our discussion, because it can be
proved that the set of all possible faces of any convex set forms a lattice. For
very important models this lattice is an orthomodular one, and can be put in
connection with the approach described below [1, 23]. In particular, the lattice of
faces of the convex set of states of a quantum system is isomorphic to the lattice
of projection operators in the associated Hilbert space [1, 23]. A similar result
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holds for classical statistical models: the lattice of faces is a Boolean one. This
means that, at least for very important models, there exists a strong connection
between the geometry of a convex set of states and the propositional algebra
associated to the system in question [36, 46]. This connection can be exploited
in order to draw conclusions about how to interpret the states of the given model.
Birkhoff and von Neumann showed [3] that the empirical propositions as-
sociated to a classical system can be naturally organized as a Boolean algebra
(which is an orthocomplemented distributive lattice [5, 15]). While classical ob-
servables are defined as functions over phase space and form a commutative
algebra, quantum observables are represented by self adjoint operators, which
fail to be commutative. Due to this fact, empirical propositions associated to
quantum systems are represented by projection operators, which are in one to
one correspondence to closed subspaces related to the projective geometry of a
Hilbert space [26, 31]. Thus, empirical propositions associated to quantum sys-
tems form a non-distributive —and thus non-Boolean— lattice.
An important example of a classical probabilistic model is provided by a point
particle moving in space time whose states are described by probability functions
over IR6. Suppose that A represents an observable quantity (i.e., it is a function
defined over the phase space). Then, the proposition “the value of A lies in the
interval ∆”, defines a testable proposition, which we denote by A∆. The proposal
of [3] is to associate A∆ to the measurable set f
−1(∆), which is the set of all
states that make the proposition true. If the probabilistic state of the system is
given by µ, the corresponding probability of occurrence of f∆ will be given by
µ(f−1(∆)). The situation is analogous for more general classical probabilistic
systems. There is a strict correspondence between a classical probabilistic state
and the axioms of classical probability theory. Indeed, the axioms of Kolmogorov
[12] define a probability function as a measure µ on a sigma-algebra Σ such that
µ : Σ → [0, 1] (2)
which satisfies
µ(∅) = 0 (3)
µ(Ac) = 1− µ(A), (4)
where (. . .)c means set-theoretical-complement. For any pairwise disjoint denu-
merable family {Ai}i∈I ,
µ(
⋃
i∈I
Ai) =
∑
i
µ(Ai). (5)
A state of a classical probabilistic theory will be defined as a Kolmogorovian
measure with Σ = P(Γ ) (where Γ and P(Γ ) denote the phase space of the
system and its measurable subsets, respectively). It is straightforward to show
that the set of all possible measures of this form is convex.
Quantum models can be described in an analogous way, but using operators
acting on Hilbert spaces instead of functions over a phase space. If A represents
the self adjoint operator associated to an observable of a quantum system, the
Vproposition “the value of A lies in the interval ∆” will define a testable experi-
ment represented by the projection operator PA(∆) ∈ P(H), i.e., the projection
that the spectral measure of A assigns to the Borel set ∆ [24]. The probability
assigned to the event PA(∆), given that the system is prepared in the state ρ,
is computed using Born’s rule [1, 25]:
p(PA(∆)) = tr(ρPA(∆)). (6)
Born’s rule defines a measure on P(H) with which it is possible to compute all
probabilities and mean values for all physical observables of interest [1, 25]. It
is well known that, due to Gleason’s theorem [34, 35], a quantum state can be
defined by a measure s over the orthomodular lattice1 of projection operators
P(H) as follows [7, 25]:
s : P(H)→ [0; 1] (7)
such that:
s(0) = 0 (0 is the null subspace). (8)
s(P⊥) = 1− s(P ), (9)
and, for a denumerable and pairwise orthogonal family of projections Pj
s(
∑
j
Pj) =
∑
j
s(Pj). (10)
As in the classical case, the set of states defined by the above equations is also
convex. Despite their mathematical resemblance, there is a big difference be-
tween classical and quantum measures. In the latter case, the Boolean algebra
Σ is replaced by P(H), and the other conditions are the natural generalizations
of the classical event structure to the non-Boolean setting. The fact that P(H) is
not Boolean lies behind the peculiarities of probabilities arising in quantum phe-
nomena. In articular, their geometrical features as convex sets are very different;
while classical models are simplexes, models arising in quantum systems have a
more involved geometry [27]. As an example, the set of probabilistic states of a
classical bit (a classical system with only two possible outcomes) forms a line
segment, while the set of states of its quantum version, the qubit (a quantum
system represented by a two dimensional Hilbert space) has the form of a sphere.
As the dimensionality grows, the geometrical features of sets of quantum states
becomes more and more involved [1]. The fact that classical states are always
simplexes, implies that each point has a unique decomposition in terms of pure
states; but this property does no longer holds in the quantum case, posing a
1 An orthomodular lattice L, is defined as an orthocomplemented lattice satisfying
that, for any a, b and c, if a ≤ c, then a ∨ (a⊥ ∧ c) = c. In the Hilbert space case,
projection operators are in one to one correspondence to closed subspaces. These
form an orthomodular lattice with “∨” representing the closure of the sum of two
subspaces, “∧” its intersection, and “(...)⊥” representing the orthogonal complement
of a given subspace. “≤” means subspace inclusion. See [22] for a detailed exposition.
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serious problem for the attempts to give an ignorance interpretation of mixed
states.
In a series of papers Murray and von Neumann searched for algebras more
general than B(H) [42–45]. The new algebras are known today as von Neumann
algebras, and their elementary components can be classified as Type I, Type II
and Type III factors. It can be shown that, the projective elements of a factor
form an orthomodular lattice. Classical models can be described as commuta-
tive von Neumann algebras. The models of standard quantum mechanics can be
described by using Type I factors (Type In for finite dimensional Hilbert spaces
and Type I∞ for infinite dimensional models). These are algebras isomorphic
to the set of bounded operators of a Hilbert space. Further work revealed that
a rigorous approach to the study of quantum systems with infinite degrees of
freedom needed the use of Type III factors, as is the case in the axiomatic for-
mulation of relativistic quantum mechanics [48, 47, 7]. A similar situation holds
in algebraic quantum statistical mechanics [7, 49]. In these models, states are de-
scribed as complex functionals satisfying certain normalization conditions, and
when restricted to the projective elements of the algebras, obey laws similar to
those given by Eqns. 7. In other words, they define measures over lattices which
are not the same to those of standard quantum mechanics. This opens the door
to a meaningful generalization of Kolmogorov’s axioms to a wide variety of or-
thomodular lattices. Thus, a general probabilistic framework can be described
by the following equations. Let L be an orthomodular lattice. Then, define
s : L → [0; 1], (11)
(L standing for the lattice of all events) such that:
s(0) = 0. (12)
s(E⊥) = 1− s(E), (13)
and, for a denumerable and pairwise orthogonal family of events Ej
s(
∑
j
Ej) =
∑
j
s(Ej). (14)
where L is a general orthomodular lattice (with L = Σ and L = P(H) for the
Kolmogorovian and quantum cases respectively).
Eqns. 11-14 define what is known as a non-commutative probability theory [7].
It is very important to remark that the above measures do not exist for certain
orthomodular lattices; for a detailed or a detailed discussion on the conditions
under which these measures are meaningful, see [23], Chapter 11. It suffices for
us that the most important physical examples fall into this scheme, and this is
indeed the case.
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3 Different ontologies
Now a question arises. Can we say something about the nature of probabilities
by simply looking at the structural properties of the above described general
framework? Is it possible to find a theoretical framework which allows us to
give a general interpretation of probabilistic statistical models? The generalized
setting is a mathematical framework capable of accommodating models of a
very different nature. Given that it contains classical statistical mechanics and
quantum mechanics as particular instances, we know that the models involved
can be very different. But there are some specific features which allow us to
extract some structural conclusions by studying the relationship between the
lattice of properties and the geometry of the set of states.
In order to find an answer to the above questions, let us start first by consid-
ering an approach based on the restrictions imposed by the algebraic features of
the event structure on the probability measures which can be defined in a com-
patible way. When the property lattice is Boolean, R. T. Cox [13, 14] showed that
the only measures compatible with the algebraic symmetries of the lattice are
those which obey the usual Kolmogorov’s axioms. Furthermore, in this approach,
Shannon’s entropic measure appears as the most natural information measure
for these models [19]. Cox approach works as follows. Start with a Boolean al-
gebra B, representing the domain of possible events available to a rational agent
(which could be an automata). The algebra is assumed to be distributive, be-
cause this fact reflects that the logic used by the agent is classical. The agent
has to put a numerical valuation to each possible proposition with a degree of
belief function ϕ. This is done in a conditional way. Thus, for example, the real
number ϕ(a|b) represents the degree of belief of the agent that a is true given
that b is true. This works as a sort of inference calculus: when we have complete
certainty, the agent uses classical logic in order to make deductions; when he
has no certainty, he must use a degree of belief function. But it turns out that,
if the function ϕ has to be compatible with the algebraic properties of B, there
are not too many options at hand: ϕ has to satisfy, up to rescaling, a set of laws
which are equivalent to those given by Kolmogorov’s axioms. This approach has
been modified and used to derive Feynman laws of probability in the quantum
setting [16–19].
But as we have seen in Section 2, if the lattice of properties involved is not
Boolean, non-Kolmogorovian measures appear. This is the case for standard non-
relativistic quantum mechanics and many other statistical models of interest,
such as those provided by algebraic quantum field theory and quantum statistical
mechanics. What happens if a rational agent has to define belief functions under
the condition that the empirical event structures depart from the Boolean realm
of classical physics?
Indeed, if the lattice of properties is represented by the orthomodular lattice
of projection operators in a Hilbert space, it is possible to show that the only
consistent possibility is given by the Born’s rule [36]. Moreover, if the lattices are
more general and non-Boolean, it can be shown that the probability measures will
not be Kolmogorovian either [36]. In this approach, the Shannon’s information
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measure must be replaced by the von Neumann’s entropy in the quantum case
and the measurement entropy in the general case [37]. Let us briefly describe
how this method works in the general case. One first starts by identifying the
algebraic structure of the event structure of a given theory T . In many cases
of interest, this will be specified as a particular orthomodular lattice L. Notice
that, in principle, this could be considered as empirical information available to
the agent. Once the algebraic properties of the event structure are determined,
a variant of Cox method can be applied by studying the constrains imposed on
the degree of belief functions. The crucial point here is that event structures
are not always organized as Boolean lattices. Thus, in order to determine the
general properties of the probabilities of a given theory, Cox’s method has to be
applied to lattices more general than Boolean ones.
The existence of this approach opens an interesting perspective for the Bayesian
interpretation of probabilities. The interpretation would be as follows. There is
an empirical scenario in which a rational agent2 (which could be an automata)
must take a decision, and with that aim, he must define a degree of belief func-
tion. Different possible experiments and results are available and they are orga-
nized in an event structure, assumed to be an orthomodular lattice. If the lattice
of events that he is facing is Boolean (as in Cox’s approach), then the measures
of degree of belief of the rational agent will obey laws equivalent to those of Kol-
mogorov. On the contrary, if the state of affairs that the agent must face presents
contextuality (as in standard quantum mechanics), the measures involved must
be non-Kolmogorovian. The natural information measures will be Shannon’s or
more general ones, according to the algebraic structure of the context involved
[37]. This kind of approach would allow for a natural justification for the pecu-
liarities of probabilities arising in quantum phenomena from the standpoint of
the Bayesian approach.
But one of the problems of the Bayesian interpretation of probabilities is
that it says nothing about ontology in a deliberate way. What can we do if
we want to go beyond the subjective approach and say something about the
nature of the models involved? As we have seen, a generalized probabilistic
model establishes a relationship between the state of the system and the results
of possible experiments to be performed on the system. Is it possible to assign
concrete properties of the system to these experiments? In the Kolmogorovian
setting, it is possible to find global valuations of the Boolean lattice to the set
{0, 1}. In other words, for each possible property, we can consistently affirm
that the system either possesses that property or does not possess it. Thus,
at least in principle, we can consider classical models as objects with definite
properties. The probabilities would simply reflect our subjective ignorance about
this objective situation.
The situation changes radically in the quantum case. The Kochen-Specker
(KS) theorem poses a serious threat for the interpretation of a quantum system as
2 It is important to notice here that different notions of “rational agent” could be
used. In particular, it would be interesting to study the possibility of using Dutch
Book Arguments in the generalized setting.
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an object with definite properties: it is not possible to establish a global Boolean
valuation to the elements of the lattice of projection operators. Of course, this
problem can be solved if hidden variables are assumed, as in the Bohmian for-
mulation of quantum theory (where the interpretation displays highly non-local
features). But one thing we know for sure: we cannot interpret the elements of
the event structure as representing definite properties of the system. The trick
of considering the state of the system as the quantum logical conjunction of all
actual properties (i.e., those properties for which the probability of occurrence
is equal to one in a given state), becomes untenable when entangled states and
improper mixtures are considered [52].
What about an interpretation in terms of bundles of properties for quantum
systems? One may think that the problem of the interpretation of quantum
systems is related to the assumption of an ontology of substances and properties,
being the system a sort of ‘carrier’ of its actual properties. In order to avoid this,
one may try to think quantum systems not as individual objects, but as bundles
of properties. According to this interpretation, properties have an ontological
priority, and there is no individual substratum acting as a carrier. In other
words, an object is no longer considered as an individual substratum possessing
properties, but simply a convergent bundle of properties without any substratum.
But again, the KS theorem threatens the interpretation of a quantum system
as a bundle of actual properties. For this reason, some authors have attempted
an interpretation of standard quantum mechanics based on bundles of possible
properties (see for example, [51] and references therein). The fact that possible
properties do not pertain to the realm of actuality, would avoid the problems
imposed by the KS theorem.
But the above considerations with regard to the impossibility of consider-
ing the elements of the event structure as a set of definite (or actual) properties,
imposes a severe restriction on the interpretation of probabilities arising in quan-
tum phenomena: an ignorance interpretation will be problematic, due to the fact
that, in these interpretations, there will always exist sets of properties for which
definite values cannot be consistently assigned previously to the measurement
process. For these reasons, it seems natural to take quantum probabilities as
ontological (provided that we want to avoid hidden variable models).
One of the key features that allows for the existence of the KS theorem is the
fact that the orthomodular lattice of projections is not Boolean. Indeed, in [39],
a detailed study of the orthomodular structures underlying the Kochen-Speker
construction is presented. As we have seen, the event structures associated to
more generalized probabilistic models can be non-Boolean in the general case.
This means that, for a vast family of non-Kolmogorovian models, we will not be
able to think about the elements of the event structure as representing actual
properties of an individual system. And with regard to the algebraic formula-
tion of physical probabilistic theories, a generalized version of the KS theorem
exists for von Neumann algebras [40] (see also [41]). Due to the existence of
these results, an interpretation based on bundles of actual properties for gen-
eralized probabilistic models seems to be problematic. As in the quantum case,
Xthe approach based on bundles of possible properties could be used instead [51].
But again, as in the standard quantum mechanics example, the probabilities
involved will no longer admit an ignorance interpretation for generalized proba-
bilistic models showing contextuality.
4 Conclusions
In this work we have discussed the connection between the event structures asso-
ciated to general non-Kolmogorovian models and measures representing states.
We reviewed an approach in which states are regarded as functions measuring
the degree of belief of a rational agent, and find that a Bayesian interpretation
seems to be suitable for the most important probabilistic models, provided that
contextual phenomena is accepted as a starting point. Of course, this program
should be worked out with more detail, specially with regard to the study of
conditional probabilities and the Bayes’ rule in the generalized setting.
In order to go beyond the subjective interpretation, we also discussed the
conditions under which the event structures can be related to properties of a
system, and inquired on the ontological aspects of such an association. Due to
the existence of generalized versions of the KS theorem, we find that for the ma-
jority of models the description of systems as bundles of actual properties will be
problematic. This opens the door to a generalization of previous approaches in
which bundles of possible properties are the elementary bricks out of which re-
ality is constructed. But in all these interpretations, an ignorance interpretation
of probabilities will no longer be possible.
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